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AB S TRACT. Emergencies are presumed to be unusual affairs, but the United States has been
in one state of emergency or another for the last forty years. That is a concern. The erosion of
democratic norms has led not only to the collapse of the traditional conceptual boundary between
ordinary rule and emergency governance, but also to the emergence of an even graver problem:
the manufactured crisis. In an age characterized by extreme partisanship, institutional gridlock,
and technological manipulation of information, it has become exceedingly easy and far more
tempting for a President to invoke extraordinary power by ginning up exigencies. To reduce this
threat to political order, we must recalibrate judicial incentives to reward good-faith invocations
of limited emergency power, while punishing efforts to solve ordinary public-policy disputes by
fabricating or grossly exaggerating problems. This Essay is a start: it recommends the situational
loss of deference whenever there is reason to believe public officials are lying about an emergency
or have grossly exaggerated the nature, severity, or duration of a real problem. It also urges review
of emergency-salient facts. These moves are more important, not less, when the government in-
vokes national security. And while it would entail a change in current practice, it would actually
represent a return to an older effort on the part of judges to insist upon truth and empiricism. The
approach would be helpful, for instance, in legal challenges to Trump's "Muslim ban" and his ef-
forts to unilaterally build a border wall and rewrite immigration policy.
INTRODUCTION
Once upon a time, emergencies were thought to be extraordinary events. It
is not that Presidents did not take the initiative to declare emergencies; they al-
ways have, and they always will. But there was a time when a President behaved
as if emergencies were temporary, let them expire after a limited time, invoked
emergency power in good faith, and acted expecting to be accountable to Con-
gress as well as the American people. Judicial intervention did not happen regu-
larly, but when it did, judges tried to enforce the sense that regular order was
expected. For instance, when the Supreme Court ruled that military commis-
sions could not be used when regular courts were capable of fulfilling the
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demands of justice, it insisted, "No doctrine involving more pernicious conse-
quences was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can
be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government."' Likewise, the
Court rebuffed President Truman's effort to seize steel mills during the Korean
War by insisting that he had bypassed laws laid out to deal with such situations
and by casting doubt on his troubling theory of inherent presidential power.2
Then norms began to break down. Or, perhaps, long-eroding norms became
more visible. Congress ceded the ability to declare emergencies, mostly by cor-
doning off areas where Presidents had historically been first movers, such as
committing troops abroad. The War Powers Act of 1973 and National Emergen-
cies Act (NEA) of 1976 exemplify this approach.' Ostensibly, these laws repre-
sented legislative efforts to reclaim power from the President, but in reality Con-
gress all but gave up the ability to demand a deliberative role before the President
acted on many important matters. In exchange, Presidents had to consult with
Congress if authority predicated on a crisis needed to be extended. But Congress
rarely acted later to stop a President. It was often less politically palatable to try
to unwind emergency action after it commenced. Telling is the fact that Congress
has never once invoked its power under the NEA to reverse a President's decla-
ration of a national emergency. On top of that, Congress carved out more and
more areas for potential emergency governance. By one count, over 136 different
statutes currently authorize a President to assert an emergency.4
Once Presidents acquired a taste for emergency governance, it became an in-
creasingly preferred way of doing business. It has offered an escape from the
drudgery of divided government and the hyper-partisanship that has made Con-
gress an unreliable partner. In practice, a crisis relieves a President from any for-
mal ex ante obligation to build political support for his initiatives. It also helps
avoid legislators' tendency to share the credit for dealing with serious problems
but dodge blame for hasty judgments. Unburdened by the need for public
1. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2, 120-21 (1866) ("The Constitution of the United States
is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its
protection all classes of men, at all times and under all circumstances.").
2. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
3. To be sure, the modern trend to legislatively delegate emergency power started during Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt's tenure, to empower the administration to deal with a cratering national
economy. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIB-
ERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (20o6); STEVEN F. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITU-
TION (2013); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWERAFTERTHEIRAN-CONTRAAFFAIR (1990).
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deliberation beforehand, Presidents have sometimes ignored any obligation to
consult with key legislators by asserting the need for secrecy and dispatch.'
Far from reining in a President, marking off areas suitable for emergency
governance has normalized adventurism in those areas and limited accountabil-
ity. In fact, this past summer, the Trump Administration claimed a continuing
national emergency "with respect to transnational criminal organizations," pur-
suant to the NEA.6 The document made conclusory assertions about how the
"activities of significant transnational criminal organizations have reached such
scope and gravity that they threaten the stability of international political and
economic systems," but gave no factual examples.' Few even noticed, much less
marked, the occasion. As of February 2019, there were thirty-one active "emer-
gencies" and, as one observer explained, America has been in "a constant state of
emergency since 1979."'
We have now crossed into an even more perilous time. A new problem rears
its head: the manufactured emergency. The manufactured emergency is a pub-
lic-policy problem whose nature or scope is fabricated or exaggerated beyond
reasonable parameters. It is not that Presidents could not make up a crisis out of
whole cloth in the past; rather, the difficulty today is that, for many political and
technological reasons, the temptation to lie on a grand scale, with potentially
disastrous consequences, is historically unprecedented. We are more susceptible
to fake crises than ever before. Lies spread quicldy and durably through social
media, the real-world consequences of acting upon lies and exaggerations have
multiplied, and those who gin up an emergency are more able to get away with
it. As Russell Muirhead and Nancy Rosenblum have explained, new conspiracist
thinking attacks essential democratic norms such as respect for political differ-
ence and the epistemological value of truth, as well as "knowledge-producing
5. The Iran-Contra affair arose after President Reagan signed a secret executive order authoriz-
ing the CIA to arm the Contra rebels in Nicaragua, in violation of the Boland Amendment.
Even when an executive initiative is not illegal, Presidents have withheld information from
Congress about planned tactical strikes or other military maneuvers out of fear that
knowledge will be leaked to the press. See generally KOH, supra note 3.
6. Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Transnational Criminal Organiza-
tions, 84 Fed. Reg. 35,513 (July 23, 2019), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2o19
-07 -23/pdf/201 9 -1 5 7 9 4.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CD7-AUV8]. The Trump Administration has
also declared a national emergency to block the property of the Venezuelan government.
7. Id.
8. Olivia B. Waxman, Trump Just Declared an Emergency at the Border. The U.S. Has Been in a





institutions."' In turn, the political mobilization of untruths and the degradation
of democratic norms have made it harder for voters not just to tell the truth from
lies, but also to sift significant false statements from ordinary lies.
A manufactured crisis is not when a public official or policy analyst makes a
good-faith call about the severity of a problem and turns out to be wrong. Those
are excusable mistakes of judgment, grounded in a shared sense of reality and
legal norms. Instead, the problem of the fake emergency entails a rejection of the
legitimate role that other institutions play within our system of government and
the broader culture of respect and accountability- evidenced by a willingness to
lie about the motives that led to government action, the ends to which power is
dispensed, and ultimately a disdain for the human beings whose lives or prop-
erty are affected.
Presidents today realize that open-ended grants of authority, coupled with
judicial acquiescence, mean their assertions of emergency power nearly always
prevail. Given an eye-popping win-loss record under legal frameworks devel-
oped for a different time,o a President's temptation when challenged on a wildly
implausible emergency is not to back down, but to lie about its nature or scope.
All that is required is someone brazen enough to do it.
A populist who lacks civic virtue or exhibits autocratic tendencies creates in-
finitely more problems for democratic governance. He might direct others to lie
about or hide inconvenient information that experts need to do their jobs or that
ordinary citizens are entitled to see. His behavior also corrupts other institutions,
such as courts, by exploiting rules devised for the benefit of public officials acting
in good faith and by expecting that judges fall in line like loyalists rather than
exercise independent judgment and due care. On top of that, a conspiracist Pres-
ident," one who has risen to power in part by harnessing the power of untruths
and shadowy claims about one or another cabal, can use the institutions of
9. RUSSELL MUIRHEAD & NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, A LOT OF PEOPLE ARE SAYING: THE NEW CON-
SPIRACISM AND THE ASSAULT ON DEMOCRACY 5 (2019); see also ANNE MERLEN, REPUBLIC OF
LIES: AMERICAN CONSPIRACY THEORISTS AND THEIR SURPRISING RISE TO POWER 15-16 (2019)
(canvassing the history of conspiracism in America, prevalent among populations experienc-
ing "threat and insecurity," which "tend to flourish especially at times of rapid social change").
10. See Fred Barbash & Deanna Paul, The Real Reason the TrumpAdministration is Constantly Losing
in Court, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2019, 12:05 PM EDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/world/national-security/the-real-reason-president-trump-is-constantly-losing-in-court
/2019 /0 3 /1 9 /f5ffbo56 -33a8-11e9-af5b-bs5b7ff322e9_story.html [https://perma.cc/9CDR
-N7VF].
ii. According to Muirhead and Rosenblum, a "presidential conspiracism" delegitimates existing
institutions, distorts their intended operation, and "degrades them in the service of conspirac-
ist claims." MUIRHEAD & ROSENBLUM, supra note 9, at 71.
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democratic government to pursue objectives that undermine constitutional ar-
rangements or deeply-held political values such as equality or pluralism.
No better evidence of the precipice upon which we find ourselves is the cur-
rent President's declaration of a national emergency in order to shift monies leg-
islatively allocated for the armed forces to pay for building a giant wall along the
Southern border.12 He has repeatedly asked Congress to fund this initiative, and
Congress, whose primary constitutional powers include appropriating monies
and providing for the common defense," has persistently refused to pay for it.
"We have an invasion of drugs and criminals coming into our country," President
Trump declared at a press conference when announcing his unilateral action,
mere hours after Congress had enacted a spending measure that excluded fund-
ing for his proposed wall.14 By invoking the NEA, he sought to invert the ordi-
nary budget process. Legislators would have to muster a veto-proof majority to
reverse his emergency-based funding initiative.
President Trump's own experts have said that a border wall is highly unlikely
to put a dent in the very problems he claims to be addressing - large numbers of
migrants and refugees heading for the United States, the scourge of human traf-
ficking, the perennial law-enforcement concern with drug smuggling." But no
matter: he long ago promised a big, beautiful wall to his supporters, and one
way or another, he wants to see it built. Manufacturing an emergency has be-
come the means to invert the regular legislative process and frustrate the prefer-
ences of a majority of voters.16 An inability to stop him will not only confirm his
12. Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg. 4949 (Feb. 15, 2019). President Trump has also declared
an emergency in order to impose "national security" tariffs on China under the Trade Expan-
sion Act. Proclamation No. 9705, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,625 (Mar. 8, 2018). And he has also claimed
national security reasons to alter rules governing the handling of asylum claims initiated by
migrants from countries to the South. Proclamation No. 9880, 84 Fed. Reg. 21,229 (May 8,
2019).
13. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
14. Peter Baker, Trump Declares a National Emergency, and Provokes a Constitutional Clash, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/15/us/politics/national
-emergency-trump.html [https://perma.cc/USNN-5KWG].
15. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENF'T ADMIN., 2018 NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESS-
MENT 19 ("A small percentage of all heroin seized by CBP along the land border was between
Ports of Entry."); Eric Schmitt et al., A Border Wall to Stop Terrorists? Experts Say That Makes
Little Sense, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2o19/ol/o8/us
/politics/trump-border-wall-terrorists.html [https://perma.cc/JY4J-BYTZ] ("Despite the
administration's focus on security threats at the border, a White House strategy document
sent to Congress last month outlining steps needed to monitor and intercept terrorists in-
cluded no reference to the need for construction of barriers, fences or walls.').





frequent boast that he alone can do what is necessary to save the republic - it will
merely embolden other, similarly unjustified emergency declarations in the fu-
ture."
These concerns go well beyond a particular President. In an environment of
already degrading political norms, a legal order's tolerance of fake crises breeds
what Robert Jay Lifton dubs "a malignant normality"" - easing the way for suc-
cessors and their allies to get away with even more significant breaches of con-
stitutional order and norms that are essential to wise governance.
Part I of this Essay briefly revisits older approaches to emergencies, empha-
sizing the importance of empirical testing before courts validate emergency au-
thority. It also argues that in a period of democratic decline, judicial passivity can
be lethal for the constitutional order. A course correction in terms of institutional
orientation is necessary to go along with any changes to doctrine.
We need not return to legal formalism. Part II recommends two modest ad-
justments that judges can make to discourage the assertion of unilateral power
based on fake crises: (1) moving toward a collapsible standard of deference; and
(2) engaging in minimal review of emergency-salient facts.
1. A VERY SHORT HISTORY OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO
EMERGENCIES
We were not always so poised to tolerate manufactured emergencies. In Ex
parte Milligan, the Supreme Court emphasized that an exigency had to be real.
Even in the midst of the Civil War, a crisis that was assuredly not fabricated,
judges worried about "pretext" for martial law, which "leads directly to anarchy
and despotism."" The concern was that, through an undisciplined assertion of
emergency, the conflict would widen in a way that obliterated all semblance of
law and order, destroying institutions and civil liberties along the way. "Martial
law cannot arise from a threatened invasion," Justice Davis declared.20 "The
border-wall.aspx [https://perma.cc/M3PA-DPEQ] ("Sixty percent of Americans opposed
major new construction of walls along the U.S.-Mexico border- the goal behind President
Donald Trump's budget showdown with Democratic leaders . . . .").
17. "I alone can fix it,' Trump famously declared at the 2016 Republican National Convention.
Yoni Appelbaum, "lAlone Can Fix It," ATLANTIC (July 21,2016), https://www.theatlantic.com
/politics/archive/2o16/o7/trump-rnc-speech-alone-fix-it/492557 [https://perma.cc/QP5K
-6FST].
18. ROBERT JAY LIFTON, THE CLIMATE SWERVE: REFLECTIONS ON MIND, HOPE, AND SURVIVAL 67-
92 (2017).
ig. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2,121,127 (1866).
20. Id. at 127 (emphasis removed).
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necessity must be actual and present; the invasion real, such as effectually closes
the courts and deposes the civil administration."21
Likewise, when Chief Justice Taney declared President Lincoln's unilateral
suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War unconstitutional, he pointed
not only to the Constitution's delegation of this power to Congress, but also to
the fact that under the circumstances, "[t] here was no danger of any obstruction
or resistance to the action of the civil authorities, and therefore no reason what-
ever for the interposition of the military."22 In other words, the executive branch
had not articulated a true exigency sufficient to upend regular constitutional op-
erations. Justice Taney warned that "if the authority which the constitution has
confided to the judiciary department and judicial officers, may thus, upon any
pretext or under any circumstances, be usurped by the military power, at its dis-
cretion, the people of the United States are no longer living under a government
of laws."23
And, while the framework for analyzing President Truman's seizure of steel
mills was largely formalistic in nature, that decision, too, contained many warn-
ings that unconstrained or exaggerated claims of crisis simply would not do.24
There is a longer and more complicated history here,25 but the key is that the
21. Id. Accord United States v. Russell, So U.S. (13 Wall) 623, 628 (1871) ("Where such an extraor-
dinary and unforeseen emergency occurs in the public service in time of war no doubt is en-
tertained that the power of the government is ample to supply for the moment the public
wants in that way to the extent of the immediate public exigency, but the public danger must
be immediate, imminent, and impending, and the emergency in the public service must be
extreme and imperative, and such as will not admit of delay or a resort to any other source of
supply, and the circumstances must be such as imperatively require the exercise of that ex-
treme power in respect to the particular property so impressed, appropriated, or destroyed.
Exigencies of the kind do arise in time of war or impending public danger, but it is the emer-
gency, as was said by a great magistrate, that gives the right, and it is clear that the emergency
must be shown to exist before the taking can be justified.").
22. Exparte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 152 (D. Md. 1861).
23. Id.
24. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring) ("Our scheme of society is more dependent than any other form of government on
knowledge and wisdom and self-discipline. . . ."); id. at 65o (Jackson, J., concurring) (" [The
Framers] knew what emergencies were, knew the pressures they engender for authoritative
action, knew, too, how they afford a ready pretext for usurpation. We may also suspect that
they suspected that emergency powers would tend to kindle emergencies.").
25. One of the most infamous misrepresentations came during World War II, when Franklin
Roosevelt's administration greatly exaggerated the national security threat posed by people of
Japanese ancestry in the United States. Even when confronted with intelligence that under-
mined the government's claim that Japanese Americans were helping Japan to invade the West
Coast, lawyers failed to correct the record, and the U.S. Supreme Court relied upon these false




nature, scope, and duration of an effort to exercise emergency power was to be
limited strictly by a real exigency.
How did we get to a place where such limits have become blurred and wa-
tered down? First, coming to power now is the generation that grew up with
robust visions of presidential leadership dancing in their heads. For them, Wa-
tergate is a distant memory. Many have come to reflexively trust a President and
to believe that second-guessing executive action is tantamount o imperiling this
country's security. Some acolytes of this view, for instance those associated with
the Federalist Society or the Heritage Foundation, have prepared for a long time
to implement a vision of the "unitary executive": a President mostly uncon-
strained in his capacities save having to stand for reelection.26 We had a glimpse
of this vision of the presidency from the architects of post-9/11 governance. But
this is the moment that many legal conservatives have been waiting for.
Second, this long-term ambition is being realized at precisely the moment
where other forms of democratic accountability have weakened-dangerously
so. As Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Huq have pointed out, problems associated with
"charismatic populism" and "partisan degradation" have intensified in the
United States.2 7 These developments have put stress on democratic institutions
and the notion of a stable rule of law. And elections are no guarantee of respect
for tradition, institutions, or liberties. Political parties, too, no longer necessarily
constrain a President's invocation of emergency power. To the contrary, other
forces, like popular movements that can capture a party's leadership and
U.S. 214 (1944). See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
(granting writ of coram nobis to correct the record because "the government deliberately omit-
ted relevant information and provided misleading information in papers before the court,"
thereby "seriously impair [ing]" the judicial process).
26. See, e.g., Eliana Johnson, The Real Reason Bill Barr is Defending Trump, POLITICO (May 1, 2019,
5:02 AM EDT), https://WWW.politico.com/story/2o19/o5/ol/william-barr-donald-trump
-mueller-report-1295273 [https://perma.cc/KK4Z-Y4UM]; Robert L. Tsai, Obstruction offus-
tice? The Damage Runs Deeper Than That, Bos. GLOBE (Apr. 19, 2019, 3:57 PM),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2o19/o4/19/obstruction-justice-the-damage-runs
-much-deeper-than-that/sdY55RoEKti4alJMNIc8OK/story.html [https://perma.cc/4XAF
-GYPH]. See generally STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT:
THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (2010) (charting the Federalist Society's ascendance
through social-network theory and explicating its promotion of the unitary executive).
27. TOM GINSBURG &Aziz Z. HUQ, How TO SAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (2018); see also
STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, How DEMOCRACIES DIE (2018); YASCHA MOUNK, THE
PEOPLE VS. DEMOCRACY: WHY OUR FREEDOM IS IN DANGER & How TO SAVE IT (2018). To be
sure, the rise of authoritarian forms of governance is not unique to the United States. Coun-
tries like Venezuela, Turkey, Hungary, Peru, and Poland have experienced similar democratic
backsliding, while others like Great Britain and Germany have also had trouble weathering
right-wing popular movements. LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 27, at 5.
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apparatus, may drive the impetus toward emergency governance in ways that
overpower experienced, norms-respecting members of a President's own party.
As a result, party elders who seem out of step may leave the party or resign from
office rather than stay and fight.2 8
Third, in Donald Trump we have a President willing to cast aside remaining
democratic norms. He not only believes in the muscular use of his constitutional
powers, he also expects there to be few, if any, legal limits to his hopes and de-
sires. He demands aides and lawyers who are ready to fulfill his wishes rather
than give him sound, though perhaps disappointing, advice. For the typical pop-
ulist leader, it might seem like a good idea to have people and institutions bend
to your will more easily; but for an erratic figure or one pushing an extreme
agenda, it means that democratic guardrails no longer seem secure.
Beyond the policies that severely test the nation's commitment to religious
equality and against national-origin discrimination are the symbolic actions that
signify a hard-edged disdain for constitutional limits. President Trump has par-
doned a sheriff who notoriously violated the rights of undocumented migrants
and refused to obey court orders.2 9 He also pardoned a soldier who killed a na-
ked, blindfolded Iraqi during interrogation.o His willingness to personally
profit from his time in office, without revealing his financial entanglements,
makes mincemeat of the Constitution's anti-corruption requirements for office
holders.31 More recently, the President's apparent plan to use foreign aid to extort
another country, Ukraine, into providing fodder to use against his political rivals
28. In both 2018 and 2019, more Republicans than Democrats have decided to retire. Russell Ber-
man, The 2o2o Congressional-Retirement Tracker, ATLANTIC (Oct. 28, 2019, 10:o8 AM ET),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2o19/11/retirement-congress-2020 -hurd
-alexander/596965 [https://perma.cc/BJ5U-HPWX] ("17 GOP House members and four
senators are forgoing reelection ... while just six Democrats in the House and one in the Sen-
ate are retiring outright.").
29. Robert L. Tsai, The Troubling Sheriffs' Movement That Joe Arpaio Supports, POLITICO (Sept, 1,
2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2o17/o9/o1/joe-arpaio-pardon-sheriffs
-movement-215566 [https://perma.cc/G2DV-685Z].
30. Reis Thebault, Trump Pardons Former Solider Who Was Convicted ofMurdering an Iraqi Prisoner,




31. Karen Yourish & Larry Buchanan, Trump Still Makes Money From His Properties. Is This Con-






betrays a contemptuous view of the law and a lack of concern for the integrity of
elections.32
Fourth, judges have themselves contributed to the rise of fabricated exigen-
cies by not merely approving aggressive assertions of emergency power, but also
tolerating outright lies and thinly veiled rationales devised by lawyers after the
fact." Judicial passivity can be easily exploited by the craven and the mendacious
alike. Judges' handling of more routine national security matters, where experts
are expected to act with professionalism and good faith, has left them unpre-
pared for fabricated crises. This expectation of regularity runs the risk of relegat-
ing judges to the role of mere observers in democracy's decline.
Where the Supreme Court once demanded that an emergency be real, today
it will rarely, if ever, scrutinize a President's motives or the evidence underlying
a crisis claim. That is especially true when there might be mixed motives: some
plausible and some blatantly unconstitutional. Consider the Muslim travel ban,
one of many examples from the national security context. Candidate Donald
Trump told the world he would try to stop Muslim people from coming to the
United States if he were elected, and one of his very first acts as President was to
sign an executive order seeking to do just that. In Trump v. Hawaii,3 a 5-4 ma-
jority of Justices approved a policy that suspended the Syrian refugee program
and barred travel from six Muslim-majority countries. The Administration jus-
tified this as a national security exception to immigration law, which bans dis-
crimination based on national origin." Not only did five Justices ignore plentiful
statements demonstrating anti-Muslim bias, they took the further step of insu-
lating some of those comments (it is not clear which) by declaring them pro-
tected by the First Amendment.36
This last point is especially troubling, as it suggests a desire on the part of
some jurists to reach for substantive constitutional rights to keep a crisis from
close scrutiny. They also refused to sort carefully through the evidence of anti-
Muslim bias, which included shifting rationales and strategies, or to offer any
guidance as to when subsequent changes to policy can be said to cleanse it of
bias." The judicial disregard for truth and clarity exemplified in that decision
32. Sharon LaFraniere, Andrew E. Kramer & Danny Hakim, Trump, Ukraine and Impeachment:
The Inside Story of How We Got Here, N.Y. TIMEs (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.ny-
times.com/2o19/11/11/us/ukraine-trump.html [https://perma.cc/BRH2-UUNU].
33. See discussion infra Section II.A.
34. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
35. Id. at 2409.
36. Id. at 2417-18.
37. Id.
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will make it harder to prove unconstitutional bias in the future - much less stem
the damage from a rising ethnonationalist sentiment."
Many judges will be tempted to employ standards of deference and review-
ability to avoid having to pronounce that exceptional power is unjustified. That
is what the majority did in Trump v. Hawaii. They brushed aside any effort to
limit the emergency-based rationales to situations where Congress would have a
hard time reacting quicldy." Instead of finding bias, the majority accepted at face
value the Administration's argument that each of the countries was singled out
for "a bona fide national security" reason (such as, that it was hard to get reliable
security information from the country) rather than its demographics.40 There
was no real analysis of why some countries like Saudi Arabia, which have clearly
been linked to sponsoring terrorism,1 were not on the list and why others, like
North Korea and Venezuela, were added at the last minute as a fig leaf. The Ad-
ministration defended the ban on grounds of exigency and claimed it was a tem-
porary measure that would be periodically reevaluated. But there is no indication
that the Administration will lift or further modify the ban on its own. In the
meantime, the evidence is adding up that the ban as enforced is, for all practical
purposes, an anti-Muslim policy.42
More recently, in a 5-4 vote, the Court lifted a stay in one of the lawsuits
challenging the President's shifting of $2.5 billion from the Pentagon's budget to
38. Contrast this posture with that of the Supreme Court in the 1940s, when a number of Justices,
such as Robert Jackson, believed it to be imperative for judges to play an active role in em-
bracing the lessons of totalitarianism and taking steps to ensure the survival of democracy in
America. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
39. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2412.
40. This aspect of the decision replayed the major errors of Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944), an ironic development since Chief Justice Roberts used the occasion to overrule that
decision. See generally ROBERT L. TSAI, PRACTICAL EQUALITY: FORGING JUSTICE IN A DIVIDED
NATION (2019); Robert L. Tsai, The Hidden Costs ofDissent, 35 CONST. COMMENT. 489 (2019).
41. Brahma Chellaney, The Global War on Terrorism Has Failed. Here's How to Win, FOREIGN POL'Y
(May 11, 2019, 2:42 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2o19/o5/11/the-global-war-on
-terrorism-has-failed-heres-how-to-win [https://perma.cc/A6UT-ABDN]; Rob Hastings,
Saudi Arabia is "Biggest Funder of Terrorists," INDEP. (Dec. 6, 2010, i:oo), https://www
.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-is-biggest-funder-of-terrorists
-2152327.html [https://perma.cc/454C-VYV8].
42. See Vahid Niayesh, Trump's Travel Ban Really Was a Muslim Ban, Data Suggests, WASH. POST
(Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2ol9/09/26/trumps-muslim
-ban-really-was-muslim-ban-thats-what-data-suggest [https://perma.cc/R7K7-59UC];






begin construction of a border wall. The terse, unsigned order said that "the
Government has made a sufficient showing at this stage that the plaintiffs have
no cause of action to obtain review."43 Most observers believe that the Justices
have doubts about the plaintiffs' standing to bring the case. But justiciability
doctrines are not neutral, long-standing rules that simply measure whether liti-
gants have a serious stake in a controversy. Rather, they are highly malleable
rules of relatively recent vintage that raise the costs of litigation and disempower
judges from participating in the project of democratic renewal." If jurists are
willing to invoke such rules when a President has declared a national emergency,
they could very well be giving a pass to a fake crisis and contributing to demo-
cratic backsliding.45
II. A PROPOSED COURSE CORRECTION
What is to be done to begin shoring up our legal infrastructure to minimize
the number of manufactured crises? The basic principle that emergencies must
be real, serious, and verifiable will have to be recovered from the byzantine set
of modern doctrines that let executive-branch officials get away with unilateral
actions. Truth, knowledge, wisdom, and accountability must be backfilled into
the system of checks and balances.
The causes of our current situation run deep, and it will take more than a few
doctrinal fixes to arrest patterns of development. But our situation is not hope-
less. And we have to start somewhere. There are several legislative possibilities,
including scaling back the number of existing laws that confer emergency power
on the President or updating them to better constrain leaders hellbent on adven-
turism. Congress has tried to reclaim power over emergencies before - for inspi-
ration, we need look no further than the original efforts to enact the NEA and
the War Powers Act. Doing so again would reduce the opportunities for fake
43. Trump v. Sierra Club, No. 19A60, 2019 WL 3369425, at *1 (July 26, 2019). Justice Breyer
wrote separately to indicate that he would have allowed the government o take bids and sign
contracts for the construction of the wall, but not begin construction. See id. at *2 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part from the grant of stay).
44. See, e.g., Patti A. Meeks, justice Scalia and the Demise of Environmental Law Standing, 8 J. LAND
USE &ENVTL. L. 343, 364 (1993); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE. L.J.
221, 221-23 (1988); Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62
CORNELLL. REv. 663, 664 (1977).
45. Perhaps the most dramatic recent example of the Supreme Court leaving the field of action is
its decision in Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019), that partisan gerrymandering
raises a non-justiciable "political question." That decision effectively sidelined the entire fed-
eral judiciary on a problem that continues to plague America's democracy, one that ordinary
politics alone is unlikely to solve anytime soon.
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emergencies and send a signal to courts to play a more active role in policing
legislative grants of authority.
As for the problem of judicial complicity, this Essay proposes two changes to
help deter manufactured crises: (1) a collapsible approach to judicial deference
and (2) a duty to probe emergency-relevant facts.
A. A Collapsible Approach to Judicial Deference
The first proposal tackles the problem of mechanical rules of deference, with
an eye toward recalibrating incentives to discourage lying about emergencies.
Modern constitutional analysis has become a set of clunky standards of review
that often obscures what is really going on and gives insufficient protection to
both government powers and individual liberties. If we cut to the chase, there
are three reasons traditionally given for affording government officials some de-
gree of deference: (1) preserving separation of powers, (2) validating empirically
sound judgments, and (3) facilitating expertise.
The first reason to defer to executive decision-making sounds in constitu-
tional structure. I will not belabor the subject of coequal respect other than to
observe that while separation of powers justifies due care in reviewing other
branches' actions, it has never meant taking a pro forma attitude to them. A base-
line of engagement is essential because the political branches already have many
tools at their disposal to cow judges or otherwise resist legal judgments. Addi-
tionally, the Madisonian theory that inspired much of the Constitution's original
design would operate like a stool with two legs if one branch did not vigorously
serve its assigned function or defend its prerogatives.
The second justification for judicial deference is that deference helps validate
the executive's empirically sound judgments. But empirically sound judgments
have reasons. Blind trust, without probing the executive's reasons, is only well-
placed when it is based on a serious need and when a policy is reasonably cali-
brated to the actual problem. Those in power should not be able to say anything
to get their way.
The third justification for judicial deference is that it facilitates expertise.
This rationale does not presuppose an overly technocratic form of governance;
it merely recognizes that some actors within our political system have skills and
resources that are not widely available and that one reason to trust executive-
branch officials is their consultation with experts who are steeped in knowledge
and experience.
Given these reasons to afford a favorable standard of review to the political
branches, it is sensible to build responsibility and consequence back into judicial
review. Deference should disappear if a challenger makes a showing that gov-




utter disregard for the truth, or undermined the third reason by intentionally
bypassing relevant expertise.
In theory, judges are already supposed to strip official actors of deference if
they act with an unconstitutional motive. The proposal here merely recognizes a
broader set of democratic failings and gives reasons to suspend situationally the
expectation of regular order.
Had this proposal been implemented in the travel-ban litigation, the first
version of the ban would have immediately triggered greater skepticism of the
government's asserted national security rationale. A small group of aides drafted
that executive order and bypassed many protocols that would have included con-
sultation with the State Department and Homeland Security - agencies that have
the most reliable information about ravelers, diplomatic relations, and terrorist
threats.4 6 The order was also not approved through the National Security Coun-
cil's regular process.47 Such procedural irregularity would have been enough to
deny deference on the ground that it lacked the requisite expert involvement.
Additionally, the mismatch between conclusory rationales such as stopping ter-
rorism-related crimes by "foreign-born individuals" and bans against entire na-
tions' populations could give rise to the inference that the rationales were pre-
textual - another reason to deny the most lenient form of review.
A streamlined burden-shifting approach could be helpful. It would initially
place responsibility on a challenger to adduce facts suggesting that a President
has contrived a rationale or engaged in procedural irregularities that ought to
lead to the rejection of deference. Government lawyers would then have an op-
portunity to rebut these allegations in an effort to continue enjoying the pre-
sumption that a policy is the product of regular order.
This collapsible approach to judicial deference would undercut the ability of
populist autocrats to make unusual, even radical, assertions of power under the
cloak of judicial legitimacy. The mistake that conventional legal actors make is
to think that such assertions of power will be one-offs rather than springboards
for broader claims of power, often based on more egregious misrepresentations.
The key to judicial review in a period of democratic degradation is to deny the
veneer of validation to executive actions that go too far and try to redirect politics
through regular channels.
The collapsible approach to deference is less strident than some other pro-
posals out there. For instance, Mark Graber and Sandy Levinson have argued
46. See Evan Perez et al., Inside the Confusion of the Trump Executive Order and Travel Ban, CNN
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that any President who reveals himself to lack civic virtue should lose the pre-
sumption of regularity.48 While my proposals labor in the same spirit, theirs is
broader by several orders of magnitude, completely denying judicial deference
to every act by an "anti-Publian" President. This is not just strong medicine; it
is a recipe for judicial superiority. Furthermore, such an overcorrection could
play into the hands of a populist autocrat by giving him a weapon by which to
bludgeon the courts into further submission. By contrast, my approach does not
require judgment of the "character" of a democratically elected official -an al-
ready dubious inquiry. It instead trains attention on narrower concerns that can
foster empirically based decision-making and stop the worst forms of dissem-
bling.
B. Emergency-Relevant Factual Review
My second proposal goes hand in hand with the first. It offers a corrective to
the general problem of insufficient attention to the factual underpinnings of
emergency justifications and the President's chosen solutions. It thus addresses
the problem that, even when courts do engage in rationality review rather than
declaring a President's action unreviewable, they are merely undertaking a per-
functory exercise rather than anything that could discourage, or at least ferret
out, manufactured crises.
The idea is to engage in some minimal review of factual assertions closely
related to the invocation of emergency power. For instance, while the term
"emergency" is not itself defined in the NEA, each provision spells out specific
kinds of exigencies that could arise. It is important to tether a President's asser-
tion of authority to those legislative grants without undermining the executive
branch's ability to deal with the mercurial qualities of a genuine exigency.
Considering emergency-relevant evidence is critical to ensuring that a crisis
is real and not contrived; that it is the kind of problem that goes beyond routine
social ills; and that the serious costs associated with emergency governance will
48. Sanford Levinson & Mark A. Graber, The Constitutional Powers ofAnti-Publian Presidents: Con-
stitutional Interpretation in a Broken Constitutional Order, 21 CHAPMAN L. REv. 133 (2018). Lev-
inson and Graber call for "judicial improvisation" to deal with an individual who is so "man-
ifestly unfit" to hold the office of President. Id. at 137, 154. "No one should assume Trump is
engaged in rational decision making in the public interest when he makes decisions that seem
better explained by his family's financial interests or his desire to avoid criminal prosecution,"
they write. Id. at 165. Likewise, because he campaigned on promises to violate the Constitu-
tion and "has demonstrated a fondness for white supremacists," he should broadly lose the




not be lightly thrust upon U.S. citizens unless there truly is an unforeseen crisis
of nationwide scope.
If such minimal factual review to detect lies seems far-fetched, here is a re-
minder of what is possible and why it matters. Last term, the Supreme Court
actually caught the Administration in a flat-out lie. It was a big lie. And for the
first time, the Justices were unafraid to demand that responsible officials would
face some consequences. In the surprising Census case, a 5-4 majority of the Jus-
tices,49 led by Chief Justice Roberts, found that the Administration's given reason
for adding a citizenship question to the 2020 census was a pretext. The Court in
Department of Commerce v. New York found that "the evidence tells a story that
does not match the explanation the Secretary gave for his decision."so The Jus-
tices did not exactly say what the real reason was (it could have been anti-His-
panic bias or a desire to entrench partisan power), but the plaintiffs had alleged
that officials added the question to depress the number of responses from un-
documented migrants and Hispanic citizens generally." The Justices did not
make that particular finding, but the majority did write that the reason officials
presented in court- that they needed citizenship information to enforce the Vot-
ing Rights Act- was a fib. 52 It was a lie told by Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross
and repeated by lawyers to federal judges -judges who saw through the cascade
of lies and were willing to call the government on it.
Because of that lie, the government could not proceed with its planned
course of action. As Chief Justice Roberts explained, "The reasoned explanation
requirement ... is meant to ensure that agencies offer genuine justifications for
important decisions, reasons that can be scrutinized by courts and the interested
public. Accepting contrived reasons would defeat the purpose of the enter-
prise."" Then, tethering the significance of falsity in reason-giving to the con-
stitutional duty of the courts, Chief Justice Roberts added: "If judicial review is
to be more than an empty ritual, it must demand something better than the
[contrived] explanation offered."54
Now, the government's lie was not in the national security domain, nor had
the President claimed emergency power." But the mendacity had national
49. Dep't of Commerce v. New York, No. 18-966 (June 27, 2019).
50. Id., slip op. at 27.
51. Id., slip op. at 9.
52. Id., slip op. at 27.
53. Id., slip op. at 28.
54. Id.
ss. Though the President briefly did consider claiming an emergency to add the citizenship ques-
tion after losing in the Supreme Court, he never followed through on that idea. Michael Wines
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significance nonetheless, for political representation and federal funding would
have been allocated based on the lie. Those consequences would have lasted at
least ten years, until the next constitutionally mandated census. What happened
in the dispute is a welcome development. To avoid the case being a one-off, we
must find ways to build on its insistence upon responsible lawyering and empir-
ical fact-finding by judges when democracy is at stake. The good news is that
there is nothing special about the Court's explanation that restricts it to the sub-
ject of the Census dispute or the law at issue (the Administrative Procedure Act).
Instead, its emphasis on reason-giving, truth, and reliability are general concepts
that underlie all aspects of judicial review and all forms of democratic accounta-
bility. We need to take these rule-of-law concerns and apply them more broadly
as we reconsider judicial tools that might no longer serve a democracy in decline.
The risk of judicial overreach can be mitigated by demanding that emer-
gency-related fact-finding be closely tethered to statutory interpretation and
congressional intentions. To the extent that statutes appear to create substantive
conditions and narrow the scope of legitimate scenarios, a fact-relevant inquiry
is justified whenever those conditions are invoked. If no such conditions can be
gleaned from a statute, a President can hardly be punished for interpreting that
law broadly. This approach will create stronger incentives on the part of Con-
gress to specify the conditions of permissible emergencies.
Moreover, judges are competent to evaluate claims about the nature or scope
of emergencies. Courts have certainly probed the nature and degree of extraor-
dinary needs before. In other areas - notably the Fourth Amendment's "special
needs" and "exigency" exceptions to the warrant rule - courts routinely demand
that the government establish a need that goes above and beyond the needs of
ordinary policing. They have even occasionally declared a crisis to be "beyond
the normal need for law enforcement."5 6
Now, let us apply this second proposal of factual review to President Trump's
proclamation asserting an emergency under the NEA to reallocate military funds
to finance a border wall. The proclamation states in relevant part:
The current situation at the southern border presents a border security
and humanitarian crisis that threatens core national security interests and
constitutes a national emergency. The southern border is a major entry
point for criminals, gang members, and illicit narcotics. The problem of
large-scale unlawful migration through the southern border is long-
standing, and despite the executive branch's exercise of existing statutory
et al.,justice Dept. Reverses Course on Citizenship Question on Census, Citing Trump's Orders, N.Y.
TIMEs (July 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/03/us/politics/census-citizenship
-question.html [https://perma.cc/AJ7E-GQUS].




authorities, the situation has worsened in certain respects in recent years.
In particular, recent years have seen sharp increases in the number of
family units entering and seeking entry to the United States and an ina-
bility to provide detention space for many of these aliens while their re-
moval proceedings are pending. If not detained, such aliens are often re-
leased into the country and are often difficult to remove from the United
States because they fail to appear for hearings, do not comply with orders
of removal, or are otherwise difficult to locate.17
The proclamation's factual assertions are conclusory, and there is no effort to
connect the hodgepodge of possible public-policy concerns with the proposed
solution of a physical border wall.
Statutes, however, explicitly limit the reasons for which a President can take
money from one pot and use it for a different purpose. One of the provisions
cited by the Administration- lo U.S.C. § 2808(a) -states that funds may be
moved on an emergency basis for "military construction" only when "necessary
to support such use of the armed forces.""
In particular, Congress has carefully delineated which reasons are legitimate
for shifting funds relied upon by the armed forces. The Administration must
make a showing that the "military construction" project envisioned will "sup-
port" the work of the armed forces rather than hurt it, and doing so is "neces-
sary" to some serious military problem." Border enforcement is generally a dif-
ferent agency's job. It is therefore unclear, without more details from the
Administration, how a border wall will help the military deal with an existing
crisis.
Moreover, some probing of the asserted emergency must take place because
it is a precondition to the exercise of the power to reallocate funds. Finally, emer-
gency-relevant probing of the facts is warranted given the enormous background
constitutional principles at stake: namely, the looming concern about a President
trying to make an end-run around Congress's power over the purse by faking an
emergency. Engaging in minimal inquiry into the facts is less intrusive than
jumping to address such an enormously fraught constitutional question and may
render doing so unnecessary.
57. Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg. 4949 (Feb. 15, 2019).
58. 10 U.S.C. § 2808(a) (2018). A separate provision relied on by the Administration does not
require that an emergency be declared, but says that those funds can be used only for the
"construction of roads and fences ... to block drug smuggling corridors across international
boundaries of the United States." To the extent the Administration relies on this provision, it
would have to show President Trump's proposed wall falls within the statute's definition of a
"fence." Id. § 284(b) (7).
59. Id. § 2808(a).
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The inquiry into the border wall illustrates one way of scrutinizing the nature
of an asserted emergency and ensuring that exceptions do not swallow ordinary
processes. In this example, the Administration would have to show empirically
that the problems of drug smuggling and human trafficking go above and be-
yond normal law enforcement concerns, and, moreover, that a physical wall
would actually have some effect on such crimes. Otherwise, judges would be in-
dulging speculation and quite possibly, approving a fabricated crisis.
CONCLUSION
I will close by bringing us back to the famous Carolene Products case,60 which
inspired so many modern rules of deference and theories of judicial review. If we
want to remain faithful to the New Deal generation's project of reconciling de-
mocracy with judicial review, that case cannot be reduced to Footnote 4's discus-
sion of "the presumption of constitutionality" and laws that might affect "dis-
crete and insular minorities." Elsewhere in the opinion, Chief Justice Harlan
Fiske Stone observed that deference depends upon the assumption of
"knowledge and experience."6 1 He also stressed the empirical soundness of the
legislative judgments in question, saying that the law being challenged was en-
acted only after an "extensive investigation" and "committee hearings, in the
course of which eminent scientists and health experts testified."6 2
We would do well to remember these original reasons that judges gave for
respecting the judgments of other officials. They imply that respect is a two-way
street. A political decision that is based on falsity or otherwise fails to show re-
spect for rule-of-law values cannot receive blind confirmation, especially when
someone reaches for emergency power. Allowing a fabricated crisis to stand will
lead to judicial subservience and, eventually, a democracy in shambles. The an-
swer for judges is to deny legal imprimatur to deeply troubling claims of author-
ity and brush back government officials who play fast and loose with the facts.
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6o. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). There, the Supreme Court famously
upheld a law that banned "filled milk" against a constitutional challenge, proclaiming that
"the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed ... unless in the
light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the
assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the
legislators." Id. at 152.
61. Id. at 152.
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